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Abstract The efficiency of how people search for an item in
visual search has, traditionally, been thought to depend on
bottom-up or top-down guidance cues. However, recent re-
search has shown that the rate at which people visually search
through a display is also affected by cognitive strategies. In
this study, we investigated the role of choice in visual search,
by asking whether giving people a choice alters both prefer-
ence for a cognitively neutral task and search behavior. Two
visual search conditions were examined: one in which partic-
ipants were given a choice of visual search task (the choice
condition), and one in which participants did not have a choice
(the no-choice condition). The results showed that the partic-
ipants in the choice condition rated the task as both more
enjoyable and likeable than did the participants in the no-
choice condition. However, despite their preferences, actual
search performance was slower and less efficient in the choice
condition than in the no-choice condition (Exp. 1). Experi-
ment 2 showed that the difference in search performance be-
tween the choice and no-choice conditions disappeared when
central executive processes became occupied with a task-
switching task. These data concur with a choice-impaired hy-
pothesis of search, in which having a choice leads to more
motivated, active search involving executive processes.
Keywords Visual search . Cognitive and attentional control .
Decisionmaking
People search for objects regularly in everyday life. Scientists
study these processes in the laboratory by asking participants
to search for a target among distractors and recording accuracy
and reaction times (RTs). Search efficiency is determined by
the RT × Set Size function, which measures how RTs increase
with the number of items (set size), to give the search slope
(Treisman & Gelade, 1980). The shallower the search slope,
the more efficient the search task. Previous research has sug-
gested that the rate at which we search is largely determined
by the type of stimuli present (e.g., Duncan & Humphreys,
1989; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel,
1989). Search efficiency can depend on bottom-up processes,
in which salient stimuli attract people’s attention, or top-down
processes, in which prior knowledge of the target’s features
guide attention to the stimuli that are task-relevant (see Wolfe
& Horowitz, 2004, for a review).
Recent work, however, has suggested that cognitive strat-
egies may also influence how people search a display. For
example, Smilek, Enns, Eastwood, and Merikle (2006) found
that search efficiency was influenced by the type of search
strategy people adopted. Participants were given a difficult
visual search task and asked to search for the target either
actively (e.g., to direct their attention deliberately to items in
the display) or passively (e.g., to let their intuition guide their
response). Even though the stimuli were the same in both
conditions, the results showed that search slopes in the passive
condition were more efficient than those in the active condi-
tion (see also Kunar et al., 2014, and Lleras & VonMühlenen,
2004, who showed that different strategies affect visual
search). Passive viewing also resulted in fewer eye move-
ments to find the target than when participants actively viewed
the display (Watson, Brennan, Kingstone, & Enns, 2010), and
reduced the deficit witnessed in the attentional blink (Olivers
&Nieuwenhuis, 2005). Given that these attentional tasks have
been influenced by differing cognitive strategies, it is possible
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that other types of contexts would also have an effect on cog-
nitive decisions. We examined this here by looking at the
effect of choice on visual search.
Much research has shown that the role of choice has a
strong influence on people’s preferences and motivation
(e.g., Bown, Read, & Summers, 2003). For example, giving
people a choice has led to better performance in education
(Reynolds & Symons, 2001), increased levels of creativity
(Amabile & Gitomer, 1984), and improved well-being in el-
derly patients (Schulz, 1976). The appeal of choice is so
strong that people often choose options that give them a wider
set of choices, even when the increased number of options
does not necessarily improve utility (Bown et al., 2003). Fur-
thermore, people show a tendency to keep their options open
and preserve their choice, even if this means losing out on
monetary payment (Shin & Ariely, 2004).
There are several explanations for why people prefer hav-
ing a choice rather than no choice at all. Bown et al. (2003)
argued that people do not initially weigh the options given in
front of them, but instead adopt a simplified heuristic that it is
better to have a larger set of options than a smaller one. This
makes sense in evolutionary terms; for example, our ancestors
would have learned that a land with more species to hunt is
much better than a land with fewer (Bown et al., 2003). A
more biological explanation is that people find the opportunity
to make a choice desirable because it increases activity in the
ventral striatum, which is part of the brain circuitry thought to
be involved in reward processing and motivating behavior
(Leotti & Delgado, 2011). This may be related to the idea that
people feel a greater sense of control when given a choice
(Inesi, Botti, Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2011; Langer,
1975), although Leotti and Delgado argued that the opportu-
nity to choose, in itself, is inherently valuable. Whatever the
explanation, it is clear that, given the option, people prefer to
have a choice rather than no choice at all.
Although previous research has shown that people prefer
choice, this has been demonstrated using questions that typically
have meaning for the participant (e.g., would you prefer out-
come A or outcome B?). In this study, we tested whether having
a choice in itself is inherently valuable, by using a cognitively
neutral task of little personal value to the participant. Here we
gave participants a visual search task, asking them to search for
an affectively neutral target (the letter T) among affectively neu-
tral distractors (letter Ls). We used these stimuli to ensure that
nothing was inherent in the task for people to either like or
dislike (typically in tasks like these, participants may, if any-
thing, find the task tedious). Two conditions were tested: a
Bchoice^ condition, in which we gave people a choice of which
visual search task they could take part in (Condition A, B, or C),
and a Bno-choice^ condition, in which people were assigned to a
predetermined visual search task. Importantly, unbeknownst to
participants in the choice condition, all three visual search tasks
were exactly the same (search for a T among Ls). Following
Experiment 1, participants were asked to rate how much they
enjoyed the task, how much they liked the task, and how diffi-
cult they found the task overall.
Our study addressed two questions. First, would giving peo-
ple a choice increase their preference of a cognitively neutral
task? If so, there should be a marked increase of enjoyment
and liking of the task in the choice relative to the no-choice
condition. Second,would giving people a choice lead to a change
in visual search performance? There were two possibilities. First,
if the rate of visual search is largely determined by bottom-up
and/or top-down strategies (e.g., Treisman&Gelade, 1980), then
giving participants a choice should not affect search efficiency at
all. We call this the choice-neutral hypothesis. In contrast, giving
people a choice could lead them to have increased motivation in
the task and to adopt a more active role when searching. It is
well-documented that people engage and persist more in a task if
they have chosen it (e.g., Deci, 1980; Lewin, 1952; Patall,
Cooper, & Robinson, 2008; Ryan & Deci, 2000). This has im-
plications for search: According to Smilek et al. (2006), if people
adopt an active strategy, their executive processes become in-
volved in the task, which leads to less efficient search behavior.
Therefore, if having a choice results in people adopting a more
active, motivated strategy, then search should be less efficient.
We call this the choice-impaired hypothesis. The results of Ex-
periment 1 showed that although giving participants a choice
enhanced their enjoyment of the search task, their performance
in relation to both search times and search efficiency worsened.
In Experiment 2, we investigated whether central executive pro-
cesses were needed for this effect to occur. If so, when we en-
sured that executive processeswere already occupiedwith a task-
switching task,1 the difference in search performance between
conditions should disappear. These results showed that when
the executive processes were fully utilized in both conditions,
there was no additional effect of choice on search performance.
Method
Participants
In all, 100 participants (61 female, 39 male; mean age =
21.0 years) took part in Experiment 1, and 20 participants took
part in Experiment 22 (11 female, nine male; mean age =
25.7 years). All of the participants had normal or corrected-
1 It is well-documented that task switching requires the use of executive
processes (see, e.g., Monsell, 2003).
2 Fewer participants were required for Experiment 2 because it did not
involve Likert questionnaires. Typical experiments investigating slope
differences in visual search tasks have used approximately 5–15 partici-
pants (e.g., Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Treisman & Gelade, 1980;
Wolfe, 1998). Therefore, following these examples, we tested 20 partic-
ipants in Experiment 2 to ensure enough statistical power to detect an
effect, if one were present.
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to-normal vision. In each experiment, participants completed
either the choice or the no-choice condition (with equal num-
bers of participants assigned to the two conditions).
Apparatus and stimuli
Displays were generated and responses recorded using Blitz
3-D programs. The distractors were L shapes presented ran-
domly in one of four orientations (0°, 90°, 180°, or 270°) on a
black background. In Experiment 1, the target was a T, rotated
90° or 270° with equal probabilities, and in Experiment 2, the
target was a T, rotated 0° or 180° with equal probabilities.
Each L contained a small offset (~0.5°) at the line junction
to make search more difficult. All stimuli subtended 1.7° ×
1.7°, at a distance of 57.4 cm. Each display had a set size of 4,
8, or 12 items, with individual stimuli positioned within a 6 ×
6 invisible matrix. Each display was uniquely generated, and
therefore displays were not repeated across the experiment. In
Experiment 1, all of the stimuli were white. In Experiment 2,
on half of the trials all stimuli were red, and on the other half
all stimuli were green.
Procedure
Participants completed an experimental block of 90 trials (30
for each set size). On each trial, a fixation dot was presented
for 500 ms, followed by the distractors and target letter. The
stimuli were presented on the screen until participants made a
response. If participants had not responded in 10,000 ms, the
display timed out and the next trial was presented. Participants
were asked to respond as quickly and as accurately as possi-
ble, and completed a short practice session before each block.
Example displays are shown in Fig. 1. In Experiment 1, par-
ticipants were asked to search and respond to the orientation of
the T, by pressing Bm^ if the bottom of the T pointed to the
right or Bz^ if the bottom pointed to the left. In Experiment 2,
the task changed on different trials, depending on the color of
the stimuli. If the stimuli were red, participants were asked to
search for an upright T; if the stimuli were green, they were
asked to search for an inverted T. Participants pressed Bm^ if
the target was present and Bz^ if the target was absent.
In the choice conditions, participants were asked to choose
which experimental block they would like to complete. Their
choice options were that they could complete either
BCondition A,^ BCondition B,^ or BCondition C.^ No other
information about the blocks was given to participants. Once
participants had chosen, they were given the corresponding
condition. However, unknown to the participants, all condi-
tions were the same in every way but their name. In the no-
choice conditions, participants were told they had been
assigned to one of the conditions and were not given a choice.
In Experiment 1, participants were asked to rate how much
they enjoyed the task, how much they liked the task, and how
difficult they found the task. Responses were collected using
three Likert scale questions ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7
(very much).
Results
In Experiment 1, RTs less than 200 ms and greater than 4,
000 ms were removed as outliers. This led to the removal of
1.4 % and 1.7 % of the data from the choice and no-choice
conditions, respectively. RTs less than 200 ms were also re-
moved fromExperiment 2 (0% of the data); however, because
the task was more difficult, no upper outlier boundary was
applied.3 Mean correct RTs are shown in Figs. 2 and 3. For
Experiment 1, a mixed-design 2 (choice vs. no choice) × 3 (set
size: 4, 8, or 12) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on correct
participant mean RTs was conducted, with the within-
participants factor Set Size and the between-participants factor
Choice. The results showed a main effect of choice, F(1, 98) =
7.2, p < .01, ηp
2 = .068, in which RTs in the choice condition
(1,318 ms) were slower than those in the no-choice condition
(1,186 ms), and a main effect of set size, F(2, 196) = 449.2, p
< .01, ηp
2 = .821, in which RTs increased with set size. The
Choice × Set Size interaction was also significant, F(2, 196) =
9.0, p < .01, ηp
2 = .084. RTs increased more with set size,
showing less efficient search, in the choice condition
(80.7 ms/item) than in the no-choice condition (61.2 ms/item).
However, this difference disappeared in Experiment 2, with
the engagement of executive processes in the task-switching
task. Here, a mixed-design 2 (choice vs. no choice) × 3 (set
size: 4, 8, or 12) × 2 (task switch vs. no task switch) × 2
(present vs. absent) ANOVA on correct participant mean
RTs was conducted, with the within-participants factors Set
Fig. 1 Example of the visual search display used in Experiment 1. The
target is a T among rotated Ls.
3 Please note that the pattern of data for Experiment 2 was the same if the
outlier removal procedure of Experiment 1 was used.
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Size, Task Switch, and Target Presence, and the between-
participants factor Choice. We observed main effects of target
presence, F(1, 18) = 25.7, p < .01, ηp
2 = .588, and of set size,
F(2, 36) = 112.4, p < .01, ηp
2 = .862. RTs for target-present
trials were faster than target-absent ones, and RTs increased
with set size. However, we found nomain effect of task switch
(F < 1), nor a main effect of choice (F < 1). A significant
Target Presence × Set Size interaction was apparent, F(2,
36) = 3.2, p = .05, ηp
2 = .151, in which RTs increased more
with set size for target-absent than for target-present trials, as
well as a significant Task Switch × Set Size interaction, F(2,
36) = 3.8, p < .05, ηp
2 = .174, in which RTs increased more
with set size for no-task-switch than for task-switch trials. The
four-way Target Presence × Task Switch × Set Size × Choice
interaction was also significant, F(2, 36) = 3.2, p = .05, ηp
2 =
.150. None of the other interactions were significant. Error
rates are shown in Table 1. For Experiment 2, we observed a
main effect of target presence, F(1, 18) = 8.6, p = .01, ηp
2 =
.309, in which more errors occurred on target-present trials
(4.04%) than on target-absent trials (4.02%), and amain effect
of set size, in which errors increased with set size, F(2, 36) =
4.0, p < .05, ηp
2 = .181. However, none of the other main
effects or interactions in either experiments were significant.
Figure 4 shows the mean ratings from the three Likert
scales in Experiment 1, asking participants how much they
enjoyed the task, how much they liked the task, and how
difficult they found the task. Three separate Mann–Whitney
U tests showed that participants in the choice condition rated
the visual search task to be more enjoyable than did partici-
pants in the no-choice task (average rank: choice = 59.7, no
choice = 41.3; U = 789.0, p < .01, r = –.32). Furthermore,
participants in the choice task showed a more positive rating
when asked how much they liked the task, as compared with
participants in the no-choice task (average rank: choice = 59.9,
no choice = 41.0; U = 778.0, p < .01, r = –.33). However, no
differences emerged in ratings of how difficult participants
found the task across the choice and no-choice groups
(average rank: choice = 53.8, no choice = 47.2; U = 1,087.0,
p = .25, r = –.11).
Discussion
Previous work has shown that people prefer options that give
them a choice (e.g., Bown et al., 2003). In this study we
examined whether people would rate a cognitively neutral
task more positively when they were offered a choice than
when no choice was given. The results showed that people
had a strong preference for a condition in which they were
given a choice, by rating the choice condition as more enjoy-
able and reporting greater liking of the task. Interestingly, this
Fig. 2 Mean correct reaction times (RTs, in milliseconds) across set sizes
for the choice and no-choice conditions in Experiment 1. Error bars
represent the standard errors.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 3 (a)Mean correct reaction times (RTs, in milliseconds) across set
sizes for all conditions in Experiment 2, for target-absent trials. (b)Mean
correct RTs (inmilliseconds) across set sizes for all conditions in Experiment
2, for target-present trials. Error bars represent the standard errors.
Table 1 Percentages of errors for the choice and no-choice conditions
across set sizes
Set Size
Condition 4 8 12
Experiment 1, choice 1.9 2.3 2.4
Experiment 1, no choice 2.1 2.4 1.9
Experiment 2, choice 3.7 6 8.7
Experiment 2, no choice 5 3 7
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preference for choice occurred in the absence of any personal
meaning to the participants. Participants were not informed of
what the different conditions were, and thus were unable to
make an informed choice. Furthermore, because the task was
devoid of affective and meaningful stimuli, and instead
consisted of neutral letter stimuli, there should not have been
anything inherently pleasurable about doing the task. Despite
this, the mere fact that participants were given a choice led
them to value the task more.
However, the option of a choice also had a negative impact
on search performance. Search was less efficient in the choice
condition than in the no-choice condition (Exp. 1). Further-
more, response speed in the choice condition was impaired
relative to the no-choice condition. These results cannot be
explained by a speed–accuracy trade-off, since error rates were
low and there were no differences in errors for choice across
conditions. Instead, the data are consistent with the choice-
impaired hypothesis, in which giving people a choice changed
their cognitive strategy, leading to less efficient search.
Previous research has shown that if participants adopt an
active search strategy, they show less efficient search than do
those who use a more passive strategy (Smilek et al., 2006).
Smilek et al. argued that this occurred because participants
were relying on slow executive-control mechanisms when
performing an active search. In contrast, people who were
passively searching relied on automatic mechanisms that
allowed for more rapid search overall (Smilek et al., 2006).
It is also well-known that giving people a choice leads to
greater motivation and effort in a task (e.g., Patall et al.,
2008). This can explain the results in our study, with people
adopting a more active search strategy involving executive
processes after the act of choosing had led them to be more
motivated and invested in the task. The use of executive pro-
cesses in the choice condition would have led to the reduced
search efficiency observed in Experiment 1. Experiment 2
gives weight to this argument, since it shows that when the
executive processes were otherwise occupied in the task-
switching task, for both the choice and no-choice conditions,
the difference in search performance across conditions disap-
peared. That is, because the executive processes were already
being utilized, they would not be available to affect search in
the choice condition. One could argue that trials in which the
task was the same on trialn as on trial n–1 (i.e., task-repeat
trials) in Experiment 2 were similar to those in Experiment 1,
and therefore should have been affected by choice. However,
crucially, in Experiment 2 participants were required to main-
tain the task instructions in working memory throughout the
experiment (including trials in which the task was repeated).
Therefore, because executive processes were being utilized on
all trial types, they would not be available to affect search in
the choice condition. The ideas of executive control and auto-
matic mechanisms could be considered similar to people’s
dual processing system, commonly known in the field of de-
cision making as System 1 and System 2. System 1 refers to
automatic procedures that are quick, effortless, and occur in
parallel, whereas System 2 requires much more detailed, con-
trolled, and complex cognitive resources (Kahneman, 2003).
In our study, we suggest that participants used the slower,
more thoughtful System 2 during the choice condition of Ex-
periment 1, resulting in slowed RTs and less efficient search.
The present data show that although presenting people with
a choice led to greater enjoyment, it did so at the price of
impairing search performance. It is generally considered that
having a choice is beneficial (Patall et al., 2008). However,
along with the benefits, these data show the costs of choice in
terms of time and efficiency. The data also add to the growing
evidence that performance in attentional tasks can be altered
by cognitive strategies. This may explain some of the recent
replication difficulties in the literature (as part of the
Breplication crisis^; Schooler, 2014). If participants’ cognitive
strategies are different across replication attempts, different
results may emerge. Further research will be needed to inves-
tigate this, but for now the present data highlight an important
issue for scientists—namely, that experimental outcomes can
be affected by a participant’s frame of mind.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons At t r ibut ion 4 .0 In te rna t ional License (h t tp : / /
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appro-
priate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Amabile, T. M., & Gitomer, J. (1984). Children’s artistic creativity: Effect
of choice in task materials. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 10, 209–215.
Bown, N. J., Read, D., & Summers, B. (2003). The lure of choice.
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 16, 297–308.
Fig. 4 Mean ratings on the Likert scales evaluating how enjoyable
participants found the task, how difficult they found the task, and how
much they liked the task. The scales ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very
much). Error bars represent the standard errors.
740 Atten Percept Psychophys (2016) 78:736–741
Deci, E. L. (1980). The psychology of self-determination. Lexington,
MA: Heath.
Duncan, J., & Humphreys, G. W. (1989). Visual search and stimulus
similarity. Psychological Review, 96, 433–458. doi:10.1037/0033-
295X.96.3.433
Inesi, M. E., Botti, S., Dubois, D., Rucker, D. D., & Galinsky, A. D.
(2011). Power and choice: Their dynamic interplay in quenching
the thirst for personal control. Psychological Science, 22, 1042–
1048. doi:10.1177/0956797611413936
Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping
bounded rationality. American Psychologist, 58, 697–720. doi:10.
1037/0003-066X.58.9.697
Kunar, M. A., Watson, D. G., Cole, L., & Cox, A. (2014). Negative
emotional stimuli reduce contextual cueing but not response times
in inefficient search.Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology,
67, 377–393.
Langer, E. J. (1975). The illusion of control. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 32, 311–328.
Leotti, L. A., & Delgado, M. R. (2011). The inherent reward of choice.
Psychological Science, 22, 1310–1318.
Lewin, K. (1952). Group decision and social change. In G. E. Swanson,
T. M. Newcomb, & E. L. Hartley (Eds.), Readings in social
psychology (pp. 459–473). New York, NY: Holt.
Lleras, A., & Von Mühlenen, A. (2004). Spatial context and top-down
strategies in visual search. Spatial Vision, 17, 465–482. doi:10.1163/
1568568041920113
Monsell, S. (2003). Task switching. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 134–
140. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00028-7
Olivers, C. N. L., & Nieuwenhuis, S. (2005). The beneficial effect of
concurrent task-irrelevant mental activity on temporal attention.
Psychological Science, 16, 265–269. doi:10.1111/j.0956-7976.
2005.01526.x
Patall, E. A., Cooper, H., & Robinson, J. C. (2008). The effects of choice
on intrinsic motivation and related outcomes: A meta-analysis of
research findings. Psychological Bulletin, 134, 270–300. doi:10.
1037/0033-2909.134.2.270
Reynolds, P. L., & Symons, S. (2001). Motivational variables and chil-
dren’s text search. Journal of Educational Psychology, 93, 14–22.
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the
facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-
being. American Psychologist, 55, 68–78. doi:10.1037/0003-
066X.55.1.68
Schooler, J.W. (2014). Metascience could rescue the Breplication crisis.^.
Nature, 515(7525), 9. doi:10.1038/515009a
Schulz, R. (1976). Effects of control and predictability on the physical
and psychological well-being of the institutionalized aged. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 33, 563–573.
Shin, J., & Ariely, D. (2004). Keeping doors open: The effect of unavail-
ability on incentives to keep options viable. Management Science,
50, 575–586.
Smilek, D., Enns, J. T., Eastwood, J. D., & Merikle, P. M. (2006). Relax!
Cognitive style influences visual search. Visual Cognition, 14, 543–
564.
Treisman, A. M., & Gelade, G. (1980). A feature-integration theory of
attention. Cognitive Psychology, 12, 97–136. doi:10.1016/0010-
0285(80)90005-5
Watson, M. R., Brennan, A. A., Kingstone, A., & Enns, J. T. (2010).
Looking versus seeing: Strategies alter eyemovements during visual
search. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 17, 543–549. doi:10.3758/
PBR.17.4.543
Wolfe, J. M. (1998). What can 1 million trials tell us about visual search?
Psychological Science, 9, 33–39. doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00006
Wolfe, J. M., Cave, K. R., & Franzel, S. L. (1989). Guided search: An
alternative to the feature integration model for visual-search.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance, 15, 419–433. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.15.3.419
Wolfe, J. M., & Horowitz, T. S. (2004). What attributes guide the deploy-
ment of visual attention and how do they do it? Nature Reviews
Neuroscience, 5, 495–501. doi:10.1038/nrn1411
Atten Percept Psychophys (2016) 78:736–741 741
